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I. CONTEXT
This paper begins with a fairly obvious comparison of two texts.
My hope, however, is that out o f this comparison a supplement w ill
emerge—an excrescence that is contained by neither and that exposes the
limits of both. T he texts under consideration are Alain Badiou's Saint
Paul: The Foundation of Universalism and Giorgio Agamben's The Time
that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. These two
works have taken center stage in a recent, and until recently largely unpredictable, Pauline revival among social and legal theorists. Neither
author makes any claim to being a Paul expert, and neither, it should be
made clear at the outset, do I. I am an interested amateur at best; but
what I take from Badiou and Agamben is less a new erudition with respect to Biblical exegesis, than a new—sometimes exhilarating, sometimes perplexing—effort to think through the problem of "political theology."

t Charles Barbour is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Western Sydney. H e works on
contemporary social and political theory, with an emerging interest in post-secularism and political
theology.
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Political theology is a term coined, to the best of my knowledge, by
Mikhail Bakunin. Bakunin used the term in the pejorative sense, after
the manner of the Left Hegelians of the Vormarz—the period in German
history "before March," or before the Berlin riots of March 1848 that
signaled the beginning of the 1848 revolution. B y "political theology,"
Balcunin meant any effort to understand the human relations in regressively theological or religious terms. Balcunin's term "political theology" was adopted and utterly transformed a few generations after the
Vormiirz by the archconservative jurist Carl Schmitt, whose use of it was
anything but pejorative. Schmitt's thesis concerning political theology is
once again well known today, but it bears repeating nonetheless: " Ail
significant concepts of the modern, theory of the state," Schmitt declares,
"are secularized theological concepts."' F or Schmitt, the whole history
of politics and law can be understood in relation to, and read indirectly
through, the history o f metaphysical systems. Understood correctly,
Schmitt proposes, theological disputes should be seen, not as empty
speculation about the ineffable mysteries of life, but as pitched battles
and hand-to-hand combat over the most basic, and most materially significant, aspects of_ -legal and political order. Moreover, whether we
know it or pot, when w
incorporate
of tropes that are derived from and ultimately
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tionship between politics and theology, and even the political implications of Paul's letters, I suspect that it is only recently that so many of us
have chosen to read them. O r at least, it is only recently that a certain
kind of scholar has chosen to read them. I don't want to speak for everyone, but I think I can say with some assurance that if a young student had
come into a seminar a decade ago when I was starting graduate school—
after the eras of deconstruction, new historicism, cultural studies, postcolonialism, and queer theory—and said they were interested in Saint
Paul, and especially Paul's articulation o f a universal and messianic
truth, they would have been met with either dumbfounded silence or vicious intellectual assassination.
On the other hand, and with the benefit of retrospect, I guess we
might have seen it coming: this return to theology among scholars in the
postmodern world. F or after we spent so much energy dismantling the
pretensions of Enlightenment reason, undermining the rational subject,
and exposing the flimsy nature of so-called neutral, objective, or scientific truth, and after so many of our philosophers had noted that the only
knowledge of interest is knowledge of the incommensurable, the undecidable, or even the sublime, one wonders where else we might have
turned if not to theology. For, if nothing else, theology gives us a fairly
consistent language for talking about our relationship with the unknowable—what cannot be contained in any system, and yet makes every such
system possible.
Either way, however we got here, here we are in an age when it
makes sense for great thinkers to speak confidently about political theology, and to read with passionate intensity the epistles of Saint Paul. So
"we must begin wherever we are,"
And
2 a this
s isDwhere
e r we
r ihappen
d a to be. Time, therefore, to begin.
s a y s ,
INTRODUCTION
q u o t i n g
interpretations of Paul seek to overN iBoth
e Badiou's
t z and
s Agamben's
c
turn
h a
e long
. history of scholarship that treats Paul as the institutionalization or pragmatic corruption of Christ's essentially liberating and revolutionary message—a reading that reached its apex, perhaps, w it h
Nietzsche, especially "Section 42" of The Anti-Christ, which is blistering
in its condemnation of Paul. Against this line of thought, both Badiou
and Agamben prefer to consider Paul, not as a believer in Christ the person, but as an apostle of the Christ-event, and specifically Christ's death
and resurrection.

1 JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 162 (Gayatri Spivak trans., The Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1998)(1967).
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Thus, they maintain that Paul's letters can and should be read independently of the Gospels, which tell the story of the life of a man who
was the Son of God. I n a certain sense, for both Badiou and Agamben,
the life of Christ, and the whole familiar debate over the historical Jesus
that raged throughout the nineteenth century and continues to this day, is
more or less irrelevant. Both treat Paul as someone who speaks, not of
the life of another man, but of a singular experience of his own. Both
read Paul, not as someone who sought to institutionalize a miraculous
event in a Church, but as someone who uses the Christ-event to articulate
a new philosophy, or more accurately a new political understanding of
being with ourselves and with others in the world—that is to say, in this
world, not a world hereafter.
More germane to the topic o f this conference, both Badiou and
Agamben are interested in Paul as an antinomial thinker, or as someone
who wants to transform entirely his reader's relationship with the law.
And finally, for both Badiou and Agamben, Paul's work is thoroughly
relevant to our own relationship with the law today. For both Badiou and
Agamben, it is largely Paul's attack on the law that makes his work relevant.
On the other hand, their agreements aside, the basic difference between Badiou and Agamben can be summed up quite perspicuously: For
Badiou, Paul's epistles or letters constitute "the foundation of universalism," whereas for Agamben, they represent "the fundamental messianic
text" in our intellectual tradition. T hat is to say, for Badiou, Paul is a
political militant, or one who states axiomatic, universal political truths
irrespective of all circulating opinions and interests. F or Agamben, on
the other hand, Paul is much more a philosopher of time and someone
who understands politics, less in terms of the statement of truths, than in
the experiences of hope and redemption.
What I would like to do now is, perhaps, a little bit pedantic, and I
apologize for that. Nonetheless it is, I think, necessary. I n Parts III and
IV, I will summarize in very broad terms the details of Badiou's and
Agamben's respective appropriations o f Paul. Wit h in each o f these
Parts, I w ill speak a little bit about the implications o f these various
claims for contemporary legal theory—at least as I understand it, and I
am no expert. Finally , in Part V. I will discuss briefly an alternative
reading of Paul, one provided by Hannah Arendt, which, while far less
fashionable, might have something important to contribute to this conversation.
For the sake of clarity, and so I don't lose my audience too quickly,
I will explain each of these points briefly: First, Badiou treats Paul as a
source for a new or renewed political militancy—one based on universal,
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axiomatic truths or what he calls "truth-events" rather than struggles over
a plurality of opinions, identities, or subject positions. I n comparison,
Agamben reads Paul as a theorist of time, and locates him in a tradition
of Jewish mysticism that culminates in the work of Walter Benjamin. I n
both Parts III and IV, regarding the ways in which Badiou's and Agamben's respective interpretations of Paul relate to contemporary legal theory, I argue that they both use Paul to reject the notion that law is a necessary condition of human social relations, or that law constitutes social
order. T o put matters far too crudely, they both use Paul to suggest that
law is dispensable, and that it is possible to image a social world or social relations without law. Finally, we have Arendt's occasional reading
of Paul. Arendt proposes that Paul invents the concept of the will—the
difference between what I want to do and what I actually do. She further
proposes that, while this distinction is o f crucial importance in private
life, it is of less importance in public life. Thus, for Arendt, Paul's rejection of the law is best understood as a mode of living with ourselves, and
doesn't really work as a way o f living with others—the latter being
something for which we need law.
When I break my argument down like this, I feel as though my
point becomes obvious. But by "obvious," I mean the word in the precise etymological sense of something that is ob via, something that is
"against" or "in" the "way." Regardless, just because it is obvious does
not mean that it is false. And, the more I think about it, the more I think
all I want to do in this paper is attach a thin, wispy tether between what is
obvious—what is in the way—and what is true.
III. BADI OU'S UNIVERSALISM

A. Badiou and the Event
Let's start, then, with Alain Badiou. I don't know how many people are familiar with Badiou's work, but his seminal text, his magnum
opus really, is a colossal book called Being and Event. I won't pretend to
have time to do anything like justice to its argument. Suffice to say, that
in Being and Event, Badiou seeks to construct an entirely new ontology—one based on mathematics and set theory rather than semiotics,
culture, or language.
Basically, Badiou proposes that existence is shot through by singular events that bear no relationship with other elements of reality, but
emerge spontaneously, as it were, out of the void. Although utterly discrete and non-relational, events rely nonetheless on militant subjects who
attach themselves to those events, or more accurately, who are created
along with them, and who maintain what Badiou calls a certain "fidelity"
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to them. T o be struck by an event, to be swept up in its sudden appearance, is also to reject everything that would allow you to make sense of it
from a particular perspective. I t is to reject what Badiou calls "cornmunitarian particularism," and, in simple terms, to be born anew.
Two things are perhaps becoming apparent: First, the reason for
Badiou's fascination with Paul, who, through his famous experience on
the road to Damascus, is swept up in the Christ-event; and second, Badiou's contempt for pluralism or the politics of identity and difference,
and everything that was so well established by the field called "cultural
studies." When I say that Badiou has "contempt" for pluralism, I am
using my words advisedly, even sparingly. Badiou thinks of cultural
studies—or what he calls "culturalist ideology"—as an "extreme" relativism that renders "equivalent" statements of truth on the one hand, and
"obscurantist and symbolically trivial apparatuses"
believes
3 o n that
t the
h epluralistic
o t celebration
h e r . of cultural identity and the production
of
new
capitalist
markets
are completely symbiotic, "perfectly
H
e
intertwined"' processes.
So we know what Badiou is against. Let's explore a little bit just
what he supports, or what he proposes as an alternative to the politics of
modem pluralism. A n d let's do that by addressing his book on Saint
Paul. Badiou reads Paul, not as a father of Roman Christendom, but as
"a subjective figure o f primary importance," "a poet-thinker o f the
event," and a "militant figure" who can contribute to what Badiou calls
"a widespread search for a new militant figure" today.
The problem Badiou sets before himself in his book on Saint Paul is
5
linking the theme of subjective freedom with that of a subject subordinated or utterly faithful to an event that cannot be predicted, contained,
or reduced to calculable knowledge in any fashion. I t is a question of
what Badiou calls a "singular universal," an event that addresses a universal truth the universality of which can exist only to the extent that a
singular subject is interpellated by it and publicly declares it. " A truth
procedure is only universal," Badiou writes, "insofar as it is supported, at
that point through which it indexes the real, by an immediate subjective
recognition of its singularity."
is
6 more
W hthan
a t a little unusual and thus requires some explanation. T he
universality
B a d i of
o autruth-event does not rely on knowledge that can verify it
m e a n s
b
y
3. ALAIN BADIOU, SAINT PAUL: THE FOUNDATION OF UNIVERSALISM 6 (Ray Brassier trans.,
" u Univ.
n Press
i 2003)
v (1997).
e r
Stanford
s 4.aM atl 10. "
5.M at 1-2.
h 6.M at e22.
r
e
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in an objective fashion. Indeed, it is a truth-event precisely to the extent
that it breaks with all forms of established knowledge and all established
modes of the law. Therefore, its universality paradoxically depends on a
singular subject who is willing to renounce within her or him self all previous markers of identity, all, as Badiou calls them, "communitarian particularisms," all structural or political "interests" and "opinions," in the
name of fidelity to the event itself.
Badiou therefore sketches out two elements o f a truth-event or
truth-procedure: (1) "[E]very truth procedure breaks with the axiomatic
principle that governs the situation and organizes its repetitive series," or
breaks with established knowledge; and, for the same reason, (2) a truth
procedure "cannot take root in the element of identity. F or if it is true
that every truth erupts as singular, its singularity is immediately universalizable."
universal
to the extent that it is an axiomatic, unquestionable truth that
7
requires
T h u sno verification, and cannot be ensnared within the logic of any
particular
situation. I t is singular to the extent that it must be articulated
,
by
a
subject
who is radically disinterested in their own location within a
w
e
situation,
or
who
has nothing to gain, and perhaps much to lose, by deh a
claring
v e it.
t
B. Badiou and Legal Theory
h
I know this all sounds a little strange, but I think Badiou's principle
e
claims—at least as they relate to theories of the law—can be understood
p
a
quite simply if we focus on two elements of his reading of Paul: (1) his
r
a
interpretation of Paul's doctrine of grace, which he calls "senseless sud
o
perabundance";
and (2) his broad outline of what he calls "the four disxcourses," or four different ways of relating to the law: the Jewish, the
oGreek, the obscurantist, and, from Badiou's perspective at least, the
fproperly Christian.
t
For Badiou, Paul's doctrine of grace or elpsis is crucial to underhstanding his antinomialism. I f law is understood in terms o f nomos,
ewhich is to say sharing, allotment, and measure, or a kind of parceling
sout of established goods, the Christ-event represents for Paul the end of
iany such distributive conception of justice. " F or Paul," Badiou mainntains, "the Christ-event is heterogeneous to the law, pure excess over
gevery prescription, grace without concept or appropriate right."
sure thataBadiou
would
m
n o putt it this way, but for our purposes we might say
u8 I
that Christ's sacrifice, in its overwhelming pointlessness, or its overl
a
r 7. M at 11.
u 8. M at 57.
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whelming one-sidedness, wipes clean the need for any further sacrifices,
or any future effort to balance our relationship with either God or one
another. I t is absolute grace, an absolute gift, and as such it renders immediately irrelevant the established or recognizable differences between
subjects and addresses or calls out to each subject in their utterly disinterested singularity.
Law is, as Badiou puts it, "the cipher of finitude"
It is what
9 a allows
n d us
h toe distribute
n c e what we already have or what is available within
Grace, on the other hand, is the gift of the
d e aafinite
t situation.
h .
infinite I t need not be distributed among us as a finite good, as it is
available to each one of us as a singular individual in infinite measure. I t
"is not strained," it is not limited, but "droppeth as the gentle rain from
heaven"
10 a IIs
grace.
S h To
a further explain Paul's antinomial proclamation, Badiou traces
out
k ewhat
s he calls "four discourses" operative in the epistles—four potential
"regimes
of discourse" or "subjective dispositions."
p e a
discourse
is
that
I2
T
h
e
J ofe"the
w prophet"
i s h and "the sign," or what legal theorists
r e
call
the
exception.
I
t
views
law as something that must issue from an
s
ineffable or unknowable "outside," like the word o f God. T he Greek
a
discourse is that of "the wise man" and "the natural totality," or what in
y
legal theory we might call natural law. I t characterizes law as a function
sof some identifiable natural order—something any rational creature can
o
deduce from within any given situation.
f
The properly Christian or soteriological discourse, Badiou mainm
tains, rejects la w in both its exceptional and its normative modes, and
e
attaches itself exclusively to an event. Badiou writes:
r
Paul's project is to show that the universal logic of salvation cannot
c be reconciled with any law, be it one that ties thought to the cosmos,
y or one that fixes the effects of an exceptional election. I t is impos, sible that the starting point be the Whole, but just as impossible that
w it be an exception to the Whole. Neither totality nor sign will do.
h One must proceed from the event as such, which is a-cosmic and illegal, refusing integration into any totality and signaling nothing.
i
But proceeding from the event delivers no law, not form of mastery,
c be it that of the wise man or the prophet."
h
i
s
f 9. Id at 81.
10. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
o
See Ephesians 2:4-9.
r 12. H A M M , supra note 3, at 41.
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Paul's project speaks to neither fact nor norm, neither exception nor order, but a pure event that transforms all relations and leaves behind no
new arrangement. A t the same time, Badiou is certain to distinguish this
new Christian discourse from any obscurantist or radically individualistic
revelation. I t is not what Badiou calls a "ravishment of the unutterable,"
lation.
While it is thoroughly dissociated from all law, indeed precisely
14
because
it is dissociated from the law and all established forms of knowlo r
edge,
b e the truth-event thoroughly relies on a subject who will declare it,
and
i n declare it publicly.
g
IV. AGAMBEN'S MESSIANISM
o v
e r I am not sure I have done a very good job of clarifying Badiou's
work,
t a but perhaps it is time to turn to Agamben, who is undoubtedly better known in North America than Badiou, largely because of his theories
k e
of sovereignty and biopower, homo sacer, bare life, and the state of exn
ception. Agamben is also a very different kind of scholar than Badiou—
b
more
of a reader of texts, especially mysterious, arcane texts, than an
yinventor of philosophical or ontological systems. T o the extent that we
s say Agamben has a "politics," it would be very different from Bacan
o
diou's
as well—less a call for militancy and statement o f axiomatic
m
truths
than a kind of studied, phlegmatic, stoical reserve, in line I suppose
e with Bartleby's famous "I would prefer not to."
Agamben's approach to Paul is also distinct from Badiou's, alt
though
they are clearly in conversation with one another on the topic.
h
While
Badiou
reads Paul as a militant figure and the foundation of unii
versalism,
Agamben
reads him as a messianic thinker, even a philoson
pher
of
time.
Time
is,
of course, one of the oldest and most complicated
g
of philosophical problems—vexing us from at least Aristotle's Physics,
o
with its loaded metaphor of potentiality and actuality, to Heidegger's
n
Being and Time, with its rejection of the "series of flows" in favor of an
e
ecstatic
relation of what is no longer and what is still yet to come.
c
Essentially, Agamben reads Paul as a thinker of "the time that rea
mains"
or the hidden time that it takes to think anything at all about time
n
itself.
This "time that remains" is, for Agamben, everywhere present but
o
everywhere
absent. I t is the presupposed but concealed condition of time
n such. Paul's messianism is not concerned with the apocalyptic "end
as
of
l times," but with what Agamben calls the "time of the end." I n short,
to
y be messianic is not to imagine a certain end to history, but to experience
e time in a certain way—as spontaneous creation of the new and metx
p 14. Id. at 54.
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
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n
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ancholic loss of the past. I n terms of political and legal theory, Agamben's book on Paul is somewhat less obtuse. I t contains two important
elements: (1) a theory of the subject on the one hand; and (2) a theory of
the law on the other. What does it mean to be a person, or more specifically, a Christian in Paul's sense? And how does a person or a Christian
relate to law?
A. Agamben and the Subject
The Time that Remains is framed as a microscopically close reading
of the opening salutation of Paul's Letter to the Romans, which Agamben renders: "Paul slave of [the] Messiah Jesus called emissary separated
unto [the] announcement of God."
detail,
significant are "called" (Idetos) and
15 E but
a ctheh two wthatoseem
r most
d
"separated"
(aphorismenos),
addressed
in the second and third chapters
i
s
of
Agamben's
book
respectively.
First,
what does it mean for Paul to be
a d d r e s s e d
"called"?
i
nWhat is a "calling"? Her e Agamben takes issue with Max
Weber's
well-known
of Paul as someone who understands
e
l a
b
o interpretation
r
a
a
"calling"
as
a
kind
of
personal
vocation
coupled with worldly indiffert
e
ence—what becomes the "protestant ethic." F or Agamben, the messianic calling to which Paul attests is neither a personal destiny nor a
worldly indifference. I t is instead a moment, an experience, which situates the called one immediately in the world. I t commands the use of
what is available, not the accumulation of possessions.
Second, and more importantly, what does it mean for Paul, who
proclaims the Christian faith as universal, to say that he has been "separated"? What is universal about separation? Agamben's point here is
related to Badiou's reflections on the "singular universal," but it is, nonetheless, considerably more finessed. F o r Badiou, every truth or truthevent is only universal insofar as it is supported by a singular subject
who declares it publicly. Agamben, on the other hand, thinks that the
Christian subject is "separated" as a certain excess or incommensurable
element that remains incoherent after every act of separation or every
separation between plural identities. Put simply, whenever humans are
divided into separate categories or identities, there always remain some
humans who fit within none of the established categories. These "separated" ones are, for Agamben, the truly universal or messianic subjects—
the ones whose proper place is no place at all. The paradigmatic example is the young Marx's conception of the proletariat, who are not an

15. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE TIME THAT REMAINS: A COMMENTARY ON THE LETTER TO THE

ROMANS 149 (Patricia Dailey trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (2000).
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identifiable economic "class," but precisely those who fit within no classification or who remain separate after every act of classification.
It is on this later point—the messianic subject as the remains, the
remnant, o r the separated—that Agamben stakes the political significance o f Paul's letters. He writes:
I f I had to mark out a political legacy in Paul's letters that was immediately traceable, I believe that the concept of the remnant would
have to play a part. Mo re specifically, it allows for a new perspective that dislodges our antiquated notions of a people and a democracy, however impossible it may be to completely renounce them.
The people is neither the all nor the part, neither the majority nor
the minority. Instead, it is that which can never coincide with itself,
as all or as part, that which infinitely remains or resists in each division, and, with all due respect to those who govern us, never allows
us to be reduced to a majority or a minority. Th is remnant is the
figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive moment, and as such is the only real political subject.
16
To simplify Agamben's point, "the people" is never something that
can be quantified or divided into majority and minority for the purposes
o f calculation and regulation. " Th e people" is only that which acts in
what Agamben calls "a decisive moment." I am sure that some o f us
hear in this passage strains o f mass democracy, revolutionary workers'
councils, and the constituent power o f the multitude. B u t I don't think
that is what Agamben has in mind.
B. Agamben and the Law
It is here that Agamben's reading o f Paul's antinomialism becomes
informative. Badiou's analysis of Paul's antinomialism is, we will recall,
fairly cut and dried: law is the figure o f death; grace is the figure o f life.
Grace abounds as an alternative to law. I t wipes clean our need for the
law. Agamben, on the other hand, tries to take seriously Paul's cla im
that the Christ-event both completes and transcends, both fulfills and destroys, the law. Th e re is actually a moment in The Time that Remains
where Agamben tries to prove that the Hegelian Aulhebung, or the notion
that something might be cancelled out and preserved at a higher level, is
directly derived fro m Hegel's reading o f Martin Luther's translation o f
Paul's wo rd katargesis, which means to abolish, preserve, and fu lfill.
Whether or not we wish to accept this textual assertion, it does get us
closer to what Agamben wants to say about law. F o r Agamben's messi-

16. M at 57.
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anic tendency suggests, not that we can do away with law as such, but
that, in treating law as a pure means, rather than an instrumental means
to an end, we might preserve it while rendering it inoperative—preserve,
we might say, the "form" of law without its force or its content.
Perhaps this aspect o f Agamben's juridical thought is most succinctly explained in a different text, namely State of Exception, where we
find the following messianic prophesy: "One day," Agamben proclaims
there, "humanity will play with la w just as children play with disused
objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free
them from it for good. Wh a t is found after the law," he continues, "is not
a more proper and original use value that precedes the law, but a new use
that is only born after it . "
1 7 H eviolence
between
r e
and la w," as Agamben says, and imagine instead a
"i p utre ' law [. 1 that does not bind, that neither commands nor prohibits
m
i g but
h says
t only itself." Such a pure law would "correspond [to]
anything,
b action
e as pure means" that "would show itself, without any relation to
an
p e on d ."s s i b
an
l e o f potentiality" that was not "founded on the primacy o f actuality
I8
tology
tand
o
T h its
i relation
to potentiality."
s
e
v
s"
19
Paul's
antinomial,
messianic promise, then, is o f a la w hollowed
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existing
world come from religious festivals: carnivals and feasts, holifdays and bacchanalia, where the generic forms o f law remain in place
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the content is scrambled and destroyed.
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Badiou's
and Agamben's respective appropriations o f Saint Paul—the
universalism
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utterly
serious, demanding militant fidelity to an event and the public
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of axiomatic truths, Agamben is sufficiently melancholic about
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the present to imagine the possibility of careless joy in the future, or in a
certain futurity that conditions every now, provided we attend to the calling without vocation and acknowledge the promise of grace.
V. ARENDT'S REPUBLICANISM
An alternative approach to Paul's epistles might be found in Arendt's far more occasional, but I think more insightful, references to
them in her work. For Arendt, Paul is the thinker who first discovers the
will, which is a kind of capricious and uncontrollable arbiter that stands
between intention and action, or what I want to do and what I actually
do—the "split subject" of psychoanalysis. I n Arendt's estimation, it is
this private, internal faculty that our intellectual tradition, or the Christian
intellectual tradition at any rate, comes to associate with freedom, for it
seems to be constrained by neither a desire that comes before it nor a
goal that it seeks to accomplish. Without purpose or aim, the will simply
decides.
At the same time, Arendt continues, this means that Paul discovers
the will in its impotence, or its inability to alter the world and engage
with the plurality of human others. For its freedom relies on its purity. I t
cannot be tainted by any difference, and it cannot be subjected to any
law, without ceasing to be, precisely, a will. That such a solitary, internal, impotent faculty would become the basis for our conception of legal
and political freedom is, for Arendt, one of the greatest mysteries and
one o f the greatest tragedies o f all human experience. Wh a t speaks
properly to the agony of being a human individual alone with oneself,
Arendt continues, or what speaks properly to the complexity of attempting to be in agreement with oneself, somehow becomes the standard for
our relations with others—as if the plurality of human affairs could be
reduced to the non-contradictory purity of a human will.
Here, then, Paul's antinomialism makes perfect sense as a private
experience or as an effort to suspend the law when relating to oneself,
but it makes no sense at all as a political mandate. F o r in the public
world, humans are never unified around a "general will"; rather, and as
the French verb partager captures quite well, they share what divides
them. Arendt's favorite metaphor for this sharing and dividing is the
table, which brings us together around the very thing that holds us apart.
Perhaps law in the sense of nomos is also such a sharing and dividing, such a common coming together for the sake of being taken apart.
For the plurality of human affairs relies, not on an event that speaks the
truth, but on the endless fictions, fantasies, and illusions that we generate
as ways of bridging, however briefly and however tendentiously, the incommensurable differences that separate us.
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